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quiry into the Legitimacy of Constitutional Policymaking by 
the Judiciary. By Michael J. Perry.t New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 1982. Pp. xi, 241. $24.00. 
Reviewed by Carl A. Auerbach2 
Professor Michael J. Perry has written an ambitious and im-
portant defense of the "legitimacy" of "fierce" judicial activism in 
advancing the rights of the individual against government. His 
thesis is that the Supreme Court neither has been nor ought to be 
confined to enforcement of the value judgments expressed by the 
framers in the constitutional text. Such "interpretive" review, says 
Perry, is relatively unimportant today. Most of the major deci-
sions of recent decades were "noninterpretive;" they derived not 
from the language of the Constitution or the values of the framers, 
but from the Justices' own values. Rejection of this kind of re-
view, he maintains, would entail a massive overhaul of modem 
constitutional law. Even if such drastic surgery were feasible, ar-
gues Perry, it would be undesirable. For noninterpretive review is 
"legitimate" in human rights cases because it is "functionally jus-
tified" and can be made compatible with the democratic principle 
of electorally accountable policy making. It is functionally justi-
fied because it "enables us to keep faith (or try to) with our com-
mitment to moral growth-or . . . with the possibility that there 
are right answers" to political-moral questions.J Without such re-
view, our government would lack this moral leadership, because 
the political branches cannot supply it. 
Perry maintains that the propriety of noninterpretive review 
varies from one constitutional context to another. It is "legiti-
mate" in cases challenging state action on federalism grounds be-
cause in that context it is "functionally justified" and the Court's 
decisions may be overturned by act of Congress. Congress may 
not only set aside state laws regulating commerce that the Court 
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has upheld; it may also authorize the states to regulate commerce 
in a manner the Court would declare unconstitutional in the ab-
sence of such authorization. Noninterpretive review in separa-
tion-of-powers cases in which there is a conflict between the 
legislative and executive branches of the federal government is 
also "legitimate" because it is "functionally justified" and consis-
tent with electorally accountable policy making since in resolving 
such conflicts "necessarily the Court defers to the the political 
judgment of at least one electorally accountable branch of the na-
tional government" -either the Congress or the President.4 But in 
the contexts of challenges to congressional action on federalism 
grounds, and separation-of-powers cases in which there is no con-
flict between the legislative and executive branches, Perry sees no 
need for noninterpretive review. 
Constitutional policy making by the courts can be reconciled 
with the principle of electoral accountability, says Perry, by con-
ceding that article III does indeed grant to Congress authority to 
limit the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the orig-
inal and appellate jurisdiction of the lower federal courts so as to 
deprive them of the power to engage in noninterpretive review of 
specified classes of cases or questions.s He maintains, however, 
that Congress may not limit the Court's power to engage in inter-
pretive review.6 
This is an impressively elaborated theory. In developing it, 
Professor Perry offers some telling criticisms of other constitu-
tional theorists .. His book has provoked me, as this review will 
demonstrate, but it has not converted me to the civil religion of 
judicial activism. 
I. 
In the first place, I have great difficulty with Perry's definition 
and use of the concepts which are so important to his thesis-
"legitimacy," "interpretive" versus "noninterpretive," "extra-
constitutional" versus "contraconstitutional," and "functional 
justification." 
4. M. PERRY, supra note 3, at 59. 
5. Article III, section 1 of the Constitution provides that the "Judicial Power of the 
United States shall be vested in one supreme Coun, and in such inferior courts as Congress 
may from time to time ordain and establish." Article III, section 2 states that in all cases 
other than those in which the Supreme Court has specified original jurisdiction the Court 
"shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and 
under such regulations as the Congress shall make." 
6. M. PERRY, supra note 3, at 130. 
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I. "Legitimacy.,, Perry's use of this concept is confusing. In 
connection with noninterpretive review, he requires the functional 
justification that gives it "legitimacy" to meet two criteria-it must 
serve "a crucial government function, perhaps even an indispensa-
ble one, that no other practice can realistically be expected to 
serve" and it must do so "in a manner that accommodates the 
principle of electorally accountable policymaking."1 But the func-
tional justification that gives interpretive review "legitimacy" does 
not have to meet the second criterion, because "[n]o one ... con-
tends that our commitment to the principle of electorally account-
able policymaking is exclusive." "We are committed as well to 
the principle that electorally accountable policymaking is con-
strained by the value judgments embodied in the constitutional 
text. ... "8 
I doubt that it is useful to describe particular lines of 
Supreme Court decisions as "legitimate" or "illegitimate." Differ-
ent groups may wish to do so, depending upon whether they share 
the values constitutionalized by the Court. But the "legitimacy" 
of the Court as an institution may be unquestioned, even when 
there is sharp disagreement with particular decisions that are the 
product of "illegitimate" types of "noninterpretive" review, in 
Perry's sense. This was demonstrated by the defeat of President 
Roosevelt's Court-packing plan. The Court's legitimacy has also 
been demonstrated at various times by the defeat of congressional 
proposals to limit its jurisdiction over specified classes of constitu-
tional claims. The American people and our political leaders 
have generally accepted the Court as an institution, regardless of 
whether it was engaging in interpretive or noninterpretive review, 
and even though it has not really been subject to formal, demo-
cratic control. 
The Court's legitimacy in this sense is also a matter of degree. 
It may be relatively high or low, increasing or declining, depend-
ing upon the reaction to its work as a whole. But the extent of the 
Court's legitimacy at any particular time does not justify the con-
tinued exercise of its power. Whether and how the Court should 
be subject to democratic control is an issue every generation may 
raise anew. 
2. "Interpretive, versus "noninterpretive, review. Perry treats this 
distinction as critical. Yet the more it is expounded, the more illu-
sive it becomes. He defines "interpretive" review as the ascertain-
7. Id at 92-93. 
8. Id at 12. 
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ment of "the constitutionality of a given [governmental] policy 
choice by reference to one of the value judgments of which the 
Constitution consists-that is, by reference to a value judgment 
embodied, though not necessarily explicitly, either in some partic-
ular provision of the text of the Constitution or in the overall 
structure of government ordained by the Constitution."9 
"Noninterpretive" review is the ascertainment of constitutionality 
by reference to "a value judgment other than one constitutional-
ized by the framers."IO This distinction, between value judgments 
constitutionalized by the framers and the Justices' own value 
judgments, seems clear enough. The trouble begins when we tum 
to the criteria Perry uses to differentiate between the two. He does 
not look solely to the text of the Constitution, but repeatedly em-
phasizes the original historical understanding of various provi-
sions, implying that this is what interpretivism requires. Perry 
says, for example, that the purpose of the first amendment was ''to 
prohibit any system of prior restraint and . . . modify the com-
mon law of seditous libel by making truth a defense and by per-
mitting the case to be tried to a jury."u Yet the constitutional 
text, here as elsewhere, is broad and grandiose, providing ample 
room for the Justices to be guided by their own values in filling it 
with content. As Professor Leonard Levy pointed out, the fact 
that the first amendment ''was not originally intended to mean 
what it has become to mean does not derogate from the states-
manship of its Framers, who formulated its language in words of 
such breath, however ambiguous, that we have been able to 
breathe a liberality of meaning into it, in keeping with the ideals 
of our expanding democracy."12 Searches for the framers' inten-
tions often encounter disagreements among historians, or are dis-
torted by the searcher's own values. Even if this were not so, it 
would make no sense to permit the framers' meaning to control. 
Again, Levy put it well: "(D]esigned by an eighteenth-century ru-
ral society," he writes, the Constitution "serves as well today as 
ever because an antiquarian historicism that would freeze its orig-
inal meaning has not guided its interpretation and was not intended 
to ."t3 
9. Jd at 10. 
10. Jd at 11. 
11. I d at 63-64. 
12. L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION xii (1960). 
13. L. LEVY, supra note 12, at 309 (italics supplied). Perry's first amendment views 
illustrate the inevitable subjectivity of the subject. Leonard Levy concluded that the origi-
nal understanding of the first amendment was that it would totally deprive Congress of 
power to make any law "abriding the freedom of speech, or of the press," and so leave the 
states with exclusive legislative authority in this area. The "prohibition on Congress," 
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A careless reader might suppose that interpretive review 
means review guided by the "antiquarian historicism" to which 
Levy refers. But the boundaries of interpretive review are not ex-
ceeded, according to Perry, if the Court should "strike down polit-
ical practices that were not present to the minds of the framers 
and that, therefore, the framers could not have specifically in-
tended to ban," so long as the practice invalidated "is the ana-
logue of a practice the framers did contemplate and mean to ban, 
different in no constitutionally significant respect from the prac-
tice the framers specifically intended to ban."l4 Interpretive re-
view, furthermore, also includes enforcing the value judgments 
embodied by the framers "in the overall structure of government 
ordained by the Constitution." 1s As thus defined, the concept 
plainly gives the Court a great deal of discretion. The values of 
the individual Justices cannot possibly be excluded from the exer-
cise of this discretion. 
Yet Perry rarely uses this expanded definition of interpretive 
review in criticizing the writings of those whose conception of the 
proper scope of judicial review is less extensive than his own. In 
this connection, he reverts to an antiquarian historicism. Thus he 
views enforcement of the Bill of Rights against the states as 
noninterpretive review because the original understanding of the 
fourteenth amendment, according to the historians Perry accepts, 
was that it would not make the Bill of Rights applicable to the 
states.16 On this basis and his view of the original meaning of the 
first amendment, Perry rejects Judge Robert Bork's position that 
the Court's first amendment doctrines, applied to limit both fed-
eral and state action, are "interpretive" because they safeguard 
freedoms essential for the democratic system of government or-
Levy concluded, "was motivated far less by a desire to give immunity to political expres-
sion than by solicitude for states' rights and the federal principle." Levy, liberty of the 
Press from Zenger lo Jefferson, in L. LEVY, JUDGMENTS: EssAYS ON AMERICAN CoNSTI· 
TUTIONAL HISTORY 136-138 (1972). Perry seems unable to accept this view of the original 
understanding. It "beggars belief," he writes, "to suggest that in the first amendment the 
framers constitutionalized a value judgment that would preclude Congress from outlawing, 
for example, any publication calling for the assasination of a federal official, or disclosing 
troop movements in time of war." M. PERRY, supra note 3, at 196, n.32. Although Perry 
points to the Sedition Act of 1798 to suppon his view of the original understanding, it is 
clear that his own values affect his historical opinion. 
14. M. PERRY, supra note 3, at 32. Perry approves John Han Ely's statement that 
interpretive review includes the identification of "the sorts o/ evils against which the consti-
tutional provision was directed" and invalidation of their "contemporary counterparts." 
ld at 32-33, 181, n.ll8 (original italics). 
15. Id at 10. 
16. ld at 63. 
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dained by the Constitution.!? The framers, Perry insists, "did not 
establish a representative democracy in anything like Bork's 
sense."Is True. But why is not Judge Bork's sense of a represen-
tative democracy a proper contemporary generalization or ab-
straction from the values implicit in the "overall structure of 
government" created by the Constitution? Granted, Bork's values 
will affect his formulation and application of this generalization, 
but nothing in the broader of Perry's two definitions of "interpre-
tive" review would preclude this inevitable phenomenon. 
To take another first amendment example, it could hardly be 
said that the Justices' own values did not enter into their decisions 
in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.I9 Yet it would be im-
possible to say that they were not engaged in interpretive review, 
as defined by Perry, when they held that the public and the press 
have a constitutional right to attend criminal trials. As Chief Jus-
tice Burger said, "[n]otwithstanding the appropriate caution 
against reading into the Constitution rights not explicitly defined, 
the Court has acknowledged that certain unarticulated rights are 
implicit in enumerated guarantees."2o 
This difficulty pervades Perry's discussion of each of the ma-
jor areas he examines. Thus he accepts Raoul Berger's conclusion 
that the original understanding of the fourteenth amendment was 
that it would constitutionalize the protections of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866 but not "serve as a charter for the political and social 
equality of the freed race."2I It was understood that the privileges 
and immunities clause would forbid "any state to deny to any of 
its residents on the basis of race any 'fundamental' right the state 
granted to its residents generally."22 These "fundamental" rights 
would include rights of the sort protected by the 1866 Act-
"rights pertaining to the physical security of one's person, freedom 
of movement, and capacity to make contracts and to acquire, 
hold, and transfer chattels and land-'life, liberty, and property' 
in the narrow original sense."23 The historical understanding of 
the equal protection clause was that it too would forbid "enact-
17. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some Firs/ Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. I, 26 
(1971). 
18. Id at 65-66. Here again, Perry relies on Leonard Levy who concluded that "the 
generation which adopted the Constitution and the Bill of Rights did not believe in a broad 
scope of freedom of expression, particularly in the realm of politics." L. LEVY, supra note 
12, at vii. 
19. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
20. ld at 579. 
21. M. PERRY,supra note 3, at 62 (citing Berger, Government by Judiciary 23 (1977)). 
22. ld 
23. ld at 62-63. 
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ment or enforcement of laws denying on the basis of race any fun-
damental right granted residents generally," and of the due 
process clause that it would forbid "denial on the basis of race of 
any judicial protections afforded residents generally for the secur-
ity of their fundamental rights."24 This view of the fourteenth 
amendment, Perry recognizes, renders the equal protection and 
due process clauses "superfluous. "2s Therefore, in reading the 
principle of the equality of the races into the amendment, the 
Court allegedly engaged in noninterpretive review because it did 
not "enforce a value judgment the framers made but, instead," 
enforced "a value judgment of its own."26 Interpretive review, 
therefore, required the result in P/essy v. Ferguson 21 and not that 
in Brown v. Board of Education .2s 
In light of Perry's analysis, I reread Plessy and Strauder v. 
West Virginia ,29 These cases were decided within living memory 
of the Civil War amendments. Professor Bickel concluded that 
the original understanding of the equal protection clause was that 
it would apply neither "to jury service, nor suffrage, nor antimis-
cegnation statutes, nor segregation."Jo Yet in Strauder the Court 
held that a state law which excluded Blacks from jury service vio-
lated the equal protection clause. The opinion reveals that the 
Justices thought they were engaged in interpretive review in the 
narrowest sense; they were construing "the spirit and meaning" of 
the fourteenth amendment in order "to carry out the purposes of 
the Framers."JJ Unanimously, they saw in the equal protection 
clause "a necessary implication of a positive immunity, or right, 
most valuable to the colored race,-the right to exemption from 
unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored,--ex-
emption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil 
society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights 
which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards 
reducing them to the condition of a subject race .... "32 
It is significant that none of the Justices on the Strauder 
Court was also on the Court that decided Plessy, except Justice 
Harlan, who dissented in P/essy. It is evident from Justice 
24. /d. at 63. 
25. /d. 
26. /d. at 67. 
27. 167 U.S. 537 (1896). 
28. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
29. 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
30. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation IJecision, 69 HARV. L. 
REv. I, 58 (1955). 
31. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. at 307. 
32. /d. at 307-08. 
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Brown's majority opinion in Plessy that the Justices were guided 
by their own values in upholding the constitutionality of state-im-
posed racial segregation. There is also little doubt that Justice 
Harlan believed he was engaging in interpretive review in the nar-
rowest sense. He was concerned, he wrote, to implement the "true 
intent and meaning" of the Civil War amendments, which he de-
scribed as "recent."JJ Indeed, in answer to the majority's argu-
ment that a state statute requiring segregation on the basis of 
religion would be held unconstitutional because "unreasonable," 
Harlan deplored the "dangerous tendency in these latter days to 
enlarge the functions of the courts, by means of judicial interfer-
ence with the will of the people as expressed by the legislature."J4 
He denied that, by dissenting, he was expressing merely his own 
view of the "policy or expediency" of the Louisiana segregation 
law.Js On the contrary, he viewed the statute as "hostile to both 
the spirit and letter of the Constitution of the United States."J6 
Perry may say Justice Harlan's history was wrong and that 
Justice Brown need not have revealed his own values. But in 
seeking to ascertain the contemporary analogues to the values 
constitutionalized by the framers, the Court will have to extract 
principles from these values. Whether a principle will incorporate 
the values alleged to be the contemporary analogues will depend 
upon how generally or abstractly it is stated. Professor Ronald 
Dworkin, for example, defends judicial activism while professing 
fidelity to the framers' values. He achieves this feat by expressing 
their values with the utmost generality and abstraction. Thus his 
"concept" or principle of equality is a generalization or abstrac-
tion from the particular "conceptions" of equality that Perry at-
tributes to the framers.J7 This enables Professor Dworkin to claim 
that the Court generally makes "substantive decisions of political 
morality not in place of judgments made by the 'Framers' but 
rather in service of those judgments."Js 
Of course, the process of generalizing or abstracting from a 
given value judgment permits Dworkin-and any court engaged 
in the same process--to smuggle their own values into the Consti-
tution under the guise of interpreting the original intent of the 
framers. As Perry writes, this process always presents a choice 
33. P1essy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. at 555, 560. 
34. ld at 558. 
35. ld 
36. ld at 583. 
37. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134 (1977); Dworkin, The Forum of 
Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469, 490 (1981). 
38. Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469, 490 (1981). 
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among "several different, competing political-moral visions" and 
the choice always imports into the Constitution the values held by 
the chooser.39 And so I agree with Perry that this is what the 
Court has been doing in most, if not all, first amendment and 
equal protection cases. Nevertheless, I cannot see a basis for tell-
ing the Court that it is not "interpreting" the Constitution in such 
cases unless the notion of interpretive review is confined to an 
"antiquarian historicism." Conceivably, the Court might have re-
stricted itself to such historicism from the time it first assumed the 
power of constitutional review, though it would thereby have im-
posed upon the nation an intolerable burden of frequent constitu-
tional amendment. But it is inconceivable that the modem Court 
will acknowledge that it has been usurping power for almost 200 
years by not so restricting itself, particularly in cases involving in-
dividual rights. The Court may overrule some decisions in this 
area, but certainly not the entire body of its work. Even a Court 
determined to show restraint will have to develop the well-estab-
lished "noninterpretive" doctrines in new cases that invoke them. 
It will continue to be extraordinarily difficult, therefore, for any 
Court to say authoritatively when it is engaging in interpretive re-
view and reflecting only the values constitutionalized by the fram-
ers, and when it is engaging in noninterpretive review and 
imposing its own values. Yet Perry demands such determinations, 
because the constitutionality of Congress' jurisdiction-limiting 
power, according to him, depends upon whether Congress is strik-
ing at interpretive or noninterpretive review. 
Similar difficulties are encountered in distinguishing between 
interpretive and noninterpretive review in federalism and separa-
tion-of-powers cases. For example, Perry concludes that the 
Court's Old Guard that invalidated congressional legislation on 
federalism grounds in the 1895-1936 period, as well as the poten-
tial New Guard that decided National League of Cities v. Usery,-w 
were engaged in noninterpretive review because they were not 
simply enforcing value judgments constitutionalized by the fram-
ers.4t Perry sees in the commerce clause the framers' intention to 
give Congress sufficient authority "to deal effectively with 
whatever problems might arise which the states individually 
would not be competent to handle."42 Granted. But the Court, 
according to Perry, is also engaged in interpretive review when it 
39. M. PERRY, supra note 3, at 75. 
40. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
41. M. PERRY, supra note 3, at 41. 
42. ld 
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enforces the values implicit in "the overall structure of govern-
ment ordained by the Constitution." Of course the Old Guard 
and the potential New Guard were constitutionalizing their own 
values. But they believed they were enforcing the framers' convic-
tions, implicit in the federal structure, that too dominant a central 
government is undesirable and that the very existence of the states 
as separate political entities should not be threatened by the fed-
eral government. Similarly, the Justices in the Steel Seizure 
Case,43 and Justice Brennan in Goldwater v. Carter,44 separation-
of-powers cases which Perry thinks illustrate noninterpretive re-
view, thought they were guided by values constitutionalized by 
the framers and also reflected "in the overall structure of govern-
ment ordained by the Constitution." 
By saying that whenever the Court's own policy judgments 
affect the result we have a case of noninterpretive review, Perry 
makes the area of interpretive review shrink to the vanishing 
point. Thus he points to Buckley v. Val eo 4s as "one of the rare 
constitutional cases in which the Court's invalidation of chal-
lenged governmental action can be explained in terms of interpre-
tive review" because there was "a manifest, indissoluble 
inconsistency between the challenged provision [of the Federal 
Election Campaign Act] and the appointments clause ofthe Con-
stitution."46 I doubt even that.47 The Court's decision invalidat-
ing the legislative vetQ4s further illustrates the difficulty of 
distinguishing between interpretive and noninterpretive review. 
Reading the majority opinion of Chief Justice Burger, one would 
conclude that the Court was engaging in interpretive review in the 
narrowest sense. But after reflecting upon Justice White's dissent-
ing opinion and Justice Powell's concurring opinion, it is impossi-
ble to say that the values of the Justices in the majority did not 
affect their judgment. 
My difficulty, in short, is that the Justices' own values will 
intrude into the process of decision making in most if not all cases, 
yet that process can plausibly be denominated "interpretive" re-
view under the definitions offered by Perry. 
3. "Contraconstitutiona/" versus "extraconstitutiona/" noninterpre-
43. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
44. 444 U.S. 996 (1979). 
45. 424 U.S. I (1976). 
46. M. PERRY, supra note 3, at 58. 
47. See Burkoff, Appointment and Removal under the Federal Constitution: The Impact 
of Buckley v. Valeo, 22 WAYNE L. REv. 1335 (1976). 
48. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chada, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983). 
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tive review. Perry defends "extraconstitutional" but not "con-
traconstitutional" review by the Supreme Court. Both are 
noninterpretive, but "extraconstitutional" review merely "goes be-
yond the value judgments established by the framers of the writ-
ten Constitution" while "contraconstitutional" review "goes 
against the framers' value judgments."49 Perry maintains that vir-
tually no constitutional doctrine promulgated by the modern 
Supreme Court has been "contraconstitutional." But he acknowl-
edges that enforcement of this body of doctrine against the states 
is arguably contraconstitutional because "contrary to the federal 
character of American government established by the framers."so 
He promises to deal with this issue in a forthcoming essay. 
A full consideration of the suggested distinction will have to 
await the promised essay. In the meantime I shall venture some 
doubts. Perry seems to be saying that the Court engages in "con-
traconstitutional" review when its decision is directly contrary to 
that required by interpretive review.s1 So, for example, if the 
Court had decided in Buckley v. Val eo that the original provisions 
of the Federal Election Campaign Act regarding the appointment 
of the members of the Commission did not violate the appoint-
ments clause of the Constitution, it would in Perry's opinion have 
engaged in contraconstitutional review. This he distinguishes 
from extraconstitutional review, which is neither derived from nor 
contradictory to the values embedded by the framers in the consti-
tutional text. Thus the number of "contraconstitutional" deci-
sions may be small or large, depending on how broadly 
"interpretive" review is defined. In any event, the Court itself is 
hardly likely to believe that it is engaging in "contraconstitu-
tional" review, and therefore the admonition to abjure this prac-
tice tells it nothing. 
Perry's discussion of Brown v. Board of Education illustrates 
some of the difficulties of applying the distinction. This decision, 
he writes, was not "contraconstitutional" because "[n]o one sug-
gests that the framers meant to require segregated public school-
ing."s2 He concedes, however, that "the proposition that the 
framers intended the equal protection clause not to prohibit segre-
gated schooling is equivalent to the proposition that they intended 
such schooling not be proscribed in the name of the particular, 
narrow value judgment they embodied in the clause."sJ "But," he 
49. M. PERRY, supra note 3, at ix (original italics). 
50. Id (original italics). 
51. Id at 74. 
52. Id 
53. Id at 200, n.SO. 
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adds, "in Brown the Court avoided acting contrary to that intent 
by not relying on the claim that its invalidation of segregated pub-
lic schooling merely represented enforcement of the framers' 
intention. Rather, the Court suggested that no one could tell 
whether the framers meant to prohibit segregated public 
schooling."s4 
Perry, of course, thinks the Court's agnosticism about origi-
nal intent was wrong-that the framers did not mean to prohibit 
segregated public schooling. But if the Court may avoid engaging 
in "contraconstitutional" review by resorting to an erroneous con-
ception of the framers' original understanding of a constitutional 
clause, it will never be acting contraconstitutionality. I also find it 
difficult to see why "the proposition that the framers intended the 
equal protection clause not to prohibit segregated public school-
ing" is not equivalent to the proposition "that they intended such 
schooling not to be proscribed." Period. Would the framers have 
been content to learn that segregated public schooling was being 
proscribed by the Court but not "in the name of the particular, 
narrow value judgment they embodied in the [equal protection] 
clause"? Weren't they more interested in the consequences of 
what they were doing than in any particular way of explaining 
these consequences? Though he belabors Raoul Berger's brand of 
interpretivism on the ground that it makes Brown "illegitimate," 
he advances no good reason why Brown should not be regarded as 
the product of "contraconstitutional" review and therefore also 
"illegitimate" from his own point of view. 
Perry also regards a decision as contraconstitutional if it was 
"reached in the exercise of a mode of judicial review the framers 
intended to foreclose."ss He agrees that the framers of the Bill of 
Rights and the fourteenth amendment did not intend to delegate 
to the Court the power "to exercise noninterpretive review under 
any open-ended provision."s6 He also agrees that the "historical 
record [Raoul] Berger examiness7 does in fact establish that the 
framers decided against giving the judiciary any part of a certain 
sort of veto over acts of Congress, a negative to be used, like the 
presidential veto, on any ground whatsoever."58 But because 
noninterpretive review is more circumscribed than "an all-pur-
54. Jd at 200-01, n.80 (original italics). 
55. Id at 74. 
56. Id at 23. 
57. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 300 (1977) (the framers rejected a spe-
cific proposal that the federal judiciary participate in a Council of Revision "to examine 
every act of Congress and by its dissent to constitute a veto."). 
58. M. PERRY, supra note 3, at 21. 
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pose veto," Perry concludes that "it cannot be said that the fram-
ers intended the judiciary not to exercise such review."59 In other 
words, "no historical materials suggest that any group of framers 
ever constitutionalized any theory of the proper scope of judicial re-
view, whether narrow, like interpretivism, or broad ,60 But if the 
framers wanted the Court to eschew noninterpretive review under 
the open-ended provisions, isn't it implicit that they wanted the 
Court to limit government action only to the extent originally un-
derstood? Isn't noninterpretive review also contrary to the "over-
all structure of government ordained by the Constitution," which 
was not intended to give the Court power to legislate so as to limit 
the powers of the other branches of government? Why isn't all 
noninterpretive review contraconstitutional? 
4. The junctional just!fication,for constitutional review. Accord-
ing to Perry, interpretive review of the acts of the other branches 
of the federal government is always "functionally justified" be-
cause neither of the other branches "has as great an institutional 
capacity as the judicial branch, much less a greater capacity," to 
enforce the framers' value judgments and thereby fulfill their in-
tention that the Constitution be the supreme law of the land.61 
Interpretive review of the acts of the states is justified because no 
other organ of the federal government can so effectively assure 
"the uniform construction and application of the Constitution as 
against inconsistent state law throughout the country."62 
Noninterpretive review is also functionally justified, but only 
when it "serves a crucial governmental function, perhaps even an 
indispensable one, that no other practice can realistically be ex-
pected to serve. "63 
Perry's concept of functional justification suffers from two 
serious flaws. First, there is no consensus about the relative ca-
pacities of the three branches of the national government to 
achieve particular constitutional objectives. Second, after nearly 
two centuries of constitutional review by the federal courts, it is 
impossible to say what alternative institutions our society could 
have developed, in the absence of judicial review, to further con-
stitutional values. As Robert Dahl has written, "To assume that 
this country has remained democratic because of its Constitution 
seems to be an obvious reversal of the relation; it is much more 
59. ld 
60. ld at 74 (emphasis in original). 
61. ld at 16. 
62. ld at 13 (quoting A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 13 (1962)). 
63. ld at 92. 
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plausible to suppose that the Constitution has remained because 
our society is essentially democratic."64 
Let me illustrate these points. Perry argues that interpretive, 
but not noninterpretive, review of the scope of the power of the 
national government vis-a-vis the states is functionally justified. 
While he relies upon Professor Herbert Wechsler for his conclu-
sion regarding noninterpretive review,6s it is clear that Professor 
Wechsler also had interpretive review in mind when he wrote that 
"the national political process in the United States-and espe-
cially the role of the states in the composition and selection of the 
central government-is intrinsically well adapted to retarding or 
restraining new intrusions by the center on the domain of the 
states."66 Agreeing with Wechsler, Dean Jesse Choper urges that 
the Court refrain from any review, on federalism grounds, of the 
scope of federal power.67 Perry never adequately explains why 
Dean Choper's view is incorrect in light of the relative capacities 
of the three branches of government to accomplish constitutional 
objectives in this area. He simply invokes the justification for in-
terpretive review in general: that without it the norms constitu-
tionalized by the framers would be unenforceable. 
Perry regards interpretive and noninterpretive review of state 
regulation and taxation of interstate commerce as justifiable be-
cause "Congress lacks the institutional capacity to attend to the 
details of hundreds if not thousands of local laws adversely affect-
ing interstate commerce. "68 Yet if the Court had steadfastly re-
fused to declare any state regulation or taxation of interstate 
commerce violative of the commerce clause (in the absence of 
congressional action), Congress might have responded by creating 
administrative mechanisms that might have accomplished consti-
tutional objectives in this area more effectively than the Court has 
done. 
A similar disagreement exists concerning separation of pow-
ers cases. Dean Choper argues that in such cases the legislative 
and executive branches can adequately defend their interests with-
out judicial intervention.69 With rare exceptions, they will arrive 
at workable compromises that can hardly be said to be inconsis-
64. R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 143 (1956). 
65. M. PERRY, supra note 3, at 43. 
66. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism, in H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, 
PoLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 78 (1961). 
67. J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL PoLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNC· 
TIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE SUPREME COURT 175 (1980). 
68. M. PERRY, supra note 3, at 39. 
69. J. CHOPER, supra note 67, at 281-308. 
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tent with the framers' judgments about separation of powers. 
Perry contends that Choper underestimates "the utility of judicial 
arbitration of interbranch conflict," though he concedes that "such 
arbitration is not literally indispensable."1o He concludes that 
there is a functional justification for even noninterpretive review 
in such cases.? I 
What if the Court had refused to intervene in the most cele-
brated of the recent separation-of-powers cases? Certainly, for ex-
ample, the method of appointment to the Federal Election 
Campaign Commission agreed to by Congress and the President 
was better suited to monitor the campaign finances of presidential 
candidates, one of the principal objectives of the Federal Election 
Campaign Act, than the method mandated by the Court in Buck-
ley v. Va/eo. I doubt that in this case the Court was institutionally 
more capable than the President and the Congress, electorally ac-
countable as they are to different constituencies, to determine the 
application of the appointments clause. 
To take another example, if the Court had refused to order 
President Nixon to tum over the Watergate tapes-which it did, 
according to Perry, in the exercise of noninterpretive review-the 
impeachment process would have proceeded to a conclusion and 
the country might have been better served. 
Finally, I doubt that the Court, in holding the legislative veto 
to be unconstitutional, was better able than Congress and the 
President to delineate the values implicit in the presentment 
clauses and bicameralism requirements of the Constitution, in 
light of the "contemporary needs" of the "modem administrative 
state."n 
Human rights issues present similar difficulties. I shall return 
to them after examining more fully Perry's functional justification 
for the imposition by the Justices of their own values when the 
Court engages in noninterpretive review in human rights cases. 
Perry rejects "tradition and/or consensus" as a "plausible 
source of norms for constitutional adjudication" because there is 
"no single, predominant American tradition . . . so determinate" 
and "no consensual values sufficiently determinate" as ''to be of 
much help in resolving the particular human rights conflicts that 
have come before the Court in the modem period and are likely to 
70. M. PERRY, supra note 3, at 57. 
71. Jd at 59. 
72. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chada, 103 S. Ct. at 2798, 2801 (White, J., 
dissenting). 
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come before it in the foreseeable future."73 Traditions and values 
in our pluralist culture are "severely fragmented ... and they in-
clude denial of freedom of expression, racial intolerance and reli-
gious bigotry."14 He is right that American traditions and values 
are not sufficiently determinate to give specific answers to the 
many human rights issues the Court is called upon to resolve. 
Nevertheless, the American people do share fundamental values 
which the Court should take account of in its decisions. Indeed, 
Perry builds his justification for noninterpretive review in human 
rights cases on the assumption that there are such shared values, 
but he describes them rather mystically. 
Perry writes that there is a "['religious'] conception of the 
American polity that seems to constitute a basic, irreducible fea-
ture of the American people's understanding of themselves" -reli-
gious not "in any sectarian, theistic or otherwise metaphysical 
sense, but in the sense of "a binding vision-a vision that serves 
as a source of unalienated self-understanding, of 'meaning' in the 
sense of existential orientation or rootedness. "1s In short, a civil 
religion. According to Perry, the "great bulk of those who have 
been responsible for establishing, developing, and maintaining the 
principal institutional constituents of the American political com-
munity . . . have understood themselves to be 'chosen' in the bib-
lical sense of that word; that is, they have understood themselves 
to be charged with a special responsibility, an obligation, among 
the nations of the world . . . to carry out God's will on earth. "76 
Alas, however, "even a chosen people ... fail in their responsibil-
ity" to realize the "higher law" and need prophets to call them to 
"provisional judgment ... in the here and now."77 The Supreme 
Court Justices are the latter-day prophets of our secular religion, 
and noninterpretive review represents the "institutionalization of 
prophecy" for the purpose of calling "the American people, actu-
ally the government, the representatives of the people-to provi-
sional judgment."7s The same American people whose traditions 
include denials of freedom of expression, racial intolerance and 
religious bigotry, according to Perry, "still see themselves as ana-
tion standing under transcendent judgment" who "understand-
even if from time to time some members of the intellectual elite 
have not-that morality is not arbitrary, that justice cannot be re-
73. M. PERRY, supra note 3, at 93-94. 
74. Jd at 93. 
75. Jd at 97 (original italics). 
76. Jd (original italics). 
77. Id at 98. 
78. Id at 98-99. 
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duced to the sum of the preferences of the collectivity."79 These 
same American people "persist in seeing themselves as a beacon 
to the world, an American Israel, especially in regard to human 
rights ('with liberty and justice for all')."so Accordingly, "they 
still value, even as they resist, prophecy-although now it might 
be called 'moral leadership.' "si Their "religious self-understand-
ing has generally involved a commitment-though not necessarily 
a fully conscious commitment-to the notion of moral evolu-
tion"-to "an ever-deepening moral understanding and to polit-
ical practices that harmonize with that understanding."s2 
Our electorally accountable policy-making institutions need 
to be called to provisional judgment by the prophet-Justices be-
cause they "are not well suited to deal" with human right "issues 
that challenge and unsettle conventional ways of understanding 
the moral universe and that serve as occasions for forging alterna-
tive ways of understanding" in a manner "that is faithful to the 
notion of moral evolution or, therefore, to our religious under-
standing of ourselves."s3 These issues include "distributive justice 
and the role of government, freedom of political dissent, racism 
and sexism, the death penalty, human sexuality."s4 On these is-
sues, the electorally accountable policy makers, because of their 
"concern for remaining in office," sometimes "tend simply to rely 
on established moral conventions ['of the greater part of their par-
ticular constituencies')" and to "refuse to see in such issues occa-
sions for moral reevaluation and possible moral growth.''s5 The 
"practice of noninterpretive review has evolved as a way of reme-
dying what would otherwise be a serious defect in American gov-
ernment-the absence of any policymaking institution that 
regularly deals with fundamental political-moral problems other 
than by mechanical reference to established moral conventions."s6 
In other words, the justification for an anti-majoritarian Supreme 
Court is precisely that it is anti-majoritarian. 
What is gained by presenting the Justices as prophets of a 
secular religion? The prophets of Israel were always dissidents 
calling the powerful to account in the name of the Lord or an 
ideal morality. The Justices, by contrast, are a tiny minority exer-
79. /d. at 98. 
80. /d. (original italics). 
81. /d. 
82. /d. at 99, 10 I. 
83. /d. at 100. 
84. /d. 
85. /d. 
86. /d. at 101. 
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cising political power. They need prophets to call them to ac-
count. They are hardly suited to the role of prophets either by 
training or professional experience. As Perry says, they "tend to 
be more or less conventional members of the class that comprises 
legislators and other policymaking officials."s7 They assume their 
high office at a time of life when their values are fairly set. Eleva-
tion to independent, lifelong positions of power, largely as a result 
of their past political associations, does not suddenly qualify them 
as prophets. If Perry's view of the function of the Court is ac-
cepted, why shouldn't preachers, or moral philosophers and theo-
logians, rather than lawyer-politicians, become Justices? 
Reluctant to put his case entirely on the alleged "religious 
aspect of American self-understanding," Perry also justifies 
noninterpretive review in human rights cases on the ground that 
Americans "as a society . . . seem to be open to the possibility 
that there are right answers to political-moral problems."ss Even 
"if evidence were slight that we are open to that possibility, we 
should be open to it."s9 Noninterpretive review "enables us to 
keep faith with" with this possibility. He acknowledges that there 
"is so much disagreement among philosophers and theologians 
over basic moral principles" that no "single authoritative moral 
system, whether philosophical or religious," can be looked to for 
"right answers."90 Yet a "right answer frequently represents ... 
a point at which a variety of philosophical and religious systems of 
moral thought and belief converge."9I Thus, Perry's justification 
for noninterpretive review is based upon a consensus, not reflect-
ing fundamental values shared by the American people, but rather 
reflecting those values shared by the presumed moral leaders of 
our society. He claims that as "a matter of comparative institu-
tional competence, the politically insulated federal judiciary is 
more likely, when the human rights issue is a deeply controversial 
87. Jd at 124. 
88. M. PERRY, supra note 3, at 102. 
89. Jd (original italics). 
90. Jd at 107-09. 
91. Jd at 109 (italics in original). Perry would do well to retlect on what Isaiah Berlin 
has written: 
The notion that there must exist final objective answers to normative ques-
tions, truth that can be demonstrated or directly intuited, that it is in principle 
possible to discover a harmonious pattern in which all values are reconciled, and 
that it is towards this unique goal that we must make; that we can uncover some 
central principle that shapes this vision, a principle which, once found, will gov-
ern our lives-this ancient and almost universal belief on which so much tradi-
tional thought and action and philosophical doctrine rests, seems to me invalid; 
and at times to have led (and still to lead) to absurdities in theory and barbarous 
consequences in practice. 
I. BERLIN, fOUR EsSAYS ON LIBERTY iv-vi (1969) (London version). 
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one, to move us in the direction of a right answer (assuming there 
is such a thing) than is the political process left to its own devices, 
which tends to resolve such issues by reflexive, mechanical refer-
ence to established moral conventions."92 
Rejection of the notion that there are "right" answers does 
not entail (pace Perry) acceptance of the view that any answer is 
as good as any other and the choice among them is "a matter of 
taste."93 A rational approach to political-moral issues appreciates 
the many difficulties that stand in the way of giving single "right" 
answers to the kinds of ethical problems that come before the 
Court. Ethical principles, even those upon which the moral "lead-
ers" tend to converge, are too indeterminate to yield answers in 
specific cases. As a consequence of the moral growth Perry 
welcomes, ethical principles change and so tend to exhibit great 
variety at different times and in different places. The possibility of 
"right" answers is also diminished by the fact that the conflicting 
values and claims among which the Court is asked to choose or 
which it may seek to accommodate are often incommensurable-
for example, a free press versus a fair trial, the free exercise of 
religion versus the establishment of religion, the environment ver-
sus jobs. 
A rational approach to ethical problems clarifies the issue by 
showing what means will be necessary to make a particular choice 
or accommodation. It insists on testing alternative choices or ac-
commodations by their consequences, in fact, for the needs of so-
ciety and its individual members. It assumes that because the 
members of a society share some fundamental values, there is 
something in each person to which appeal can be made in the 
event of disagreement with the hope of arriving at a solution ac-
ceptable to all. 
A rational approach puts the matter of relative institutional 
competence in a different light. It is by no means clear that the 
Court is better able than the other branches of government to ex-
plore the factual dimensions of moral judgments. Its heavy case 
load inhibits it from engaging in such exploration.94 Furthermore, 
even after all these years the Court has not resolved the problem 
92. ld at 102. 
93. ld at 103. 
94. In the October 1982 Term, there were 5,311 cases on the Court's docket and 141 
signed opinions were issued. Chief Justice Burger commented at the 1983 meeting of the 
American Law Institute: "It is at the very least open to serious question whether 140 full 
scale signed opinions can be written and still meet the standard of quality that the bar and 
the public have a right to expect from the Supreme Court of the United States." Address of 
Chief Justice Burger to the American Law Institute, May 17, 1983, 51 L.W. 2714 (May 31, 
1983). 
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of how to determine the facts it regards as material for constitu-
tional decisions. 
It is difficult to generalize about relative institutional compe-
tence. On the whole, the historical evidence does not support the 
conclusion that the Court has been a better protector of the wel-
fare and liberties of the American people than the other branches 
of government. To me, the principal index of moral development 
is the extent of individual concern for the needs of others and the 
extent to which a society's horizons of sympathy are enlarging. 
Careful examination of the work of Congress and the state legisla-
tures will reveal that legislation has enlarged the scope of individ-
ual freedom in this century and that this legislation has been 
guided by principles that are as clear and as morally and intellec-
tually respectable as those that have been enunciated by the 
Court. Obviously this is true in the area of distributive justice be-
cause of the development of the welfare state. But in some areas 
of human rights, too, the legislatures have been more protective 
than the Court.95 Perry underestimates the role of political lead-
ership throughout our history. This is not to say that the decisions 
reached by the political process are always "right" any more than 
the decisions of the Court are always "right." But I cannot accept 
the view that the Court's decisions are more likely to be "right" 
simply because they are more likely to oppose the moral conven-
tions prevailing at a particular time. Such opposition does not 
necessarily move us to a higher plane of moral evolution. 
Perry does not deny the Court's fallibility. But he believes 
that "in the foreseeable future the Court is likely to hand down 
only few (if any) decisions destined for the widespread condemna-
tion now visited on cases such as Lochner" and that "the function 
of noninterpretive review is generally salutary."% He pleads that 
"we must resist specious historical generalizations about the per-
formance of the Supreme Court."97 "The issue for the present 
generation of constitutional theorists is . . . whether noninterpre-
tive review has served a salutary, perhaps crucial government 
(policymaking) function during the modem period."9s 
Perry is certain of the answer to this question-"few mem-
bers of the American polity," he thinks, ''would today take issue 
with much of what the Court has done in the name of either free-
dom of expression or equal protection."99 Even the Court's mod-
95. See CHOPER, supra note 67, at 222, n.209 (cited by Perry at 46). 
96. M. PERRY, supra note 3, at 116. 
97. ld 
98. ld 
99. Jd at 117. 
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em policy-making in substantive due process cases, which "has 
been aimed at according the individual's interest in sexual, repro-
ductive and associational autonomy a constitutional status," con-
sists mainly of "right" answers "approaching or perhaps even 
reaching an emergent point of convergence among a variety of 
systematic moral theories."1oo The Court's work in other human 
rights cases, such as those involving freedom of religion and crim-
inal procedure, "has also functioned, on balance, as an instrument 
of deepening moral insight and of moral growth." 101 Perry recog-
nizes that someday the Court may persistently generate policy 
choices that are morally infirm.102 Because "constitutional theory 
must not be propounded in a historical vacuum; it must be sensi-
tive to context-the context of our own time," the defender of 
noninterpretive review, should this possibility eventuate, "has the 
option of becoming ... a defender of interpretive review in-
stead."lo3 The cynicism of this position penetrates the verbiage. 
There is no constitutional theory for all seasons. Those who be-
lieve in laissez-faire should applaud the noninterpretive review of 
the Old Guard in the 1920s and 1930s. Those who favor regula-
tion of the economy may, with equal justification, attack the 
noninterpretive review that constitutionalized laissez-faire. Simi-
larly, one may defend or oppose noninterpretive review of human 
rights issues by the modem Court depending upon whether one 
approves or disapproves of the resulting decisions. One may es-
pouse noninterpretive review in some areas (human rights) and 
interpretive review in others (economic regulation), or vice versa. 
And one never knows how long one will remain a defender of 
either kind of review in any branch of constitutional law. It may 
depend upon how many appointments to the Court President 
Reagan will be able to make. What is the use, then, of constitu-
tional theory? 
In assessing the functional justification for judicial review in 
human rights cases, we cannot know how the other branches of 
the federal government would have behaved if such review had 
not been available and the responsibility for safeguarding consti-
tutional values had been solely theirs. Perry does not sufficiently 
appreciate James Bradley Thayer's admonition: 
the power of the judiciary to disregard unconstitutional legislation ... is always 
attended with a serious evil, namely, that the correction of legislative mistakes 
100. /d at 117-18. 
101. /d at 118. 
102. Id at 119. 
103. /d 
158 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 1:137 
comes from the outside, and the people thus lose the political experience, and the 
moral education and stimulus that comes from fighting the questions out in the 
ordinary way, and correcting their own errors .... The tendency of a common 
and easy resort to this great function, now lamentably too common, is to dwarf 
the political capacity of the people, and to deaden its sense of moral 
responsibility.l04 
Looking abroad, it can hardly be said that civil liberties and 
minority rights in the areas Perry regards as crucial are protected 
more in the United States than in other Western democracies that 
do not tolerate judicial invalidation of the acts of the supreme leg-
islature or the govemment.•os 
III. 
To reconcile noninterpretive review with democracy, Perry 
acknowledges Congress' authority to limit the appellate jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court and the original and appellate jurisdic-
tion of the lower federal courts so as to deprive them of the power 
to engage in such review of specified classes of cases or ques-
tions.l06 If this reconciliation is to be more than a debater's point, 
it must be shown that Congress' exercise of its jurisdiction-limit-
ing power can be effective. Perry tries to demonstrate that this is 
104. J.B. THAYER, O.W. HOLMES & F. FRANKFURTER, JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, OLI-
VER WENDELL HOLMES AND FELIX FRANKFURTER ON JOHN MARSHALL 85-86 (1967). 
105. Perry sees signs of the American system of constitutional review spreading in Eu-
rope. He cites an article written by Anthony Lester, a Queen's Counsel, expressing the 
hope that by 1989 "fundamental rights will be enforceable in UK courts under a written 
constitution forming the paramount law of the nation in harmony with the paramount law 
of the new community of Europe." I venture to guess that this hope is doomed to disap-
pointment. In any case, there is nothing in Mr. Lester's article to indicate he espouses 
anything li.k.e Perry's brand of judicial activism. The European Court of Justice at Luxem-
bourg, which was created to help implement the Treaty of Rome that established the Euro-
pean Community, has been li.k.ened to the United States Supreme Court. But it is already 
being criticized "for transcending the limits of what 'according to common opinion' are the 
functions of courts" and "though trying to conceal it, ... acting as a lawmaker." The lack 
of a strong legislative organ of the European Community provides a justification for the 
work of the European Court of Justice in the interest of European integration that does not 
apply to the United States Supreme Court. 
106. M. PERRY, supra note 3, at 219, n.l64. Professor Perry erroneously cites Ex parte 
McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869) as authority for the proposition that Congress may 
specify the classes of cases over which the Court may exercise appellate jurisdiction. When 
McCardle is read together with Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869), it appears that 
the 1868 Congressional act upheld by the Court in McCardle, which repealed the 1867 act 
authorizing McCardle to petition a lower federal court for habeas corpus and then appeal 
the denial of his petition to the Supreme Court, was not an act depriving the Court of 
appellate jurisdiction over a specified class of cases. It was only an act th~t close~ one 
route to the Court for appellate review, leaving another route open. Never tn our history 
has Congress withdrawn the Court's appellate jurisdiction over specified classes of consti-
tutional claims. It should also be noted that, on Perry's reading of McCardle, the Court 
was trying to engage in interpretive review, and Perry does not acknowledge that Congress' 
jurisdiction-limiting power may constitutionally control such review. 
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so, though he trusts that the power will not be used frequently. He 
considers the reasons why Congress has not exercised this power 
in the past. In the first place, doubts about the constitutional 
scope of the power have inhibited its use. Perry argues that these 
doubts would be removed by acceptance of his views.to7 But this 
sanguine prediction ignores the great difficulty of distinguishing 
between interpretive and noninterpretive review, an issue that 
would perpetuate constitutional doubts. 
Legislative inertia may also explain why Congress has not 
used its jurisdiction-limiting power. Perry contends that the bur-
den of setting Congress in motion must be borne by all who seek 
some action from it; those who want Congress to curb the Court 
are no worse off than those who want other kinds of legislation. 
This is a persuasive argument; but it must be tempered. In all 
other areas, legislative inertia tends to perpetuate a status quo pro-
duced by electorally accountable policy making. Inertia resulting 
in failure to exercise the jurisdiction-limiting power perpetuates 
the constitutional policy making of the Justices speaking in the 
name of fundamental law. The burden of moving Congress to 
exercise this power will be heavier than that carried by the propo-
nents of any other type of legislation. 
To Perry, this fact is not displeasing. He emphasizes that 
"frequent, unreflective resort to the jurisdiction-limiting power 
would reduce to little more than a transient whisper the now pow-
erful, not easily ignored voice of the Court" in the ongoing "dia-
logue between Court and polity."tos "The burden of legislative 
inertia serves to enhance the Court's voice by enhancing the allied 
voice of those in Congress, likely only a minority, who are pre-
pared to defend--or at least to take very seriously, to the point of 
not disturbing the Court's position on a given, deeply controver-
sial political-moral issue."I09 Thus Perry thinks that a principal 
reason why the jurisdiction-limiting power has not been used is 
that there usually are enough members of Congress who approve 
of the Court's human rights decisions to be able to kill any juris-
diction-limiting proposal. This observation, which may be true, 
tends to show that the jurisdiction-limiting power is not an effec-
tive way to reconcile noninterpretive review with electorally-ac-
countable policymaking. For a "minority" in Congress is able to 
uphold the action of a handful of Justices in nullifying legislation 
that was passed after overcoming the weight of legislative inertia. 
107. M. PERRY, supra note 3, at 134. 
108. Id at 135. 
109. /d 
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I am not at all certain that Perry is correct in supposing that 
Congress would continue to be so passive if his theory were gener-
ally accepted. In the first place, he thinks it is "obligatory as an 
ethical matter" that the Court candidly indicate when and why it 
is engaging in noninterpretive review.110 He would not deprive a 
Justice of the "linguistic convention of saying that the action vio-
lates the Constitution [the equal protection clause, for example], 
so long as the justice is candidly clear that by that he or she means 
not that the action offends the original understanding of the 
clause, but that it contravenes the Court's developing equal pro-
tection doctrine, which is itself not explicable in terms of any 
value judgment constitutionalized by the framers."111 Perry re-
jects the view of Professor Martin Shapiro that it would be "sui-
cide" for the Court "to disavow publicly the myth upon which its 
power rests."112 Be that as it may, candor on the Court's part is 
more than an ethical matter under Perry's constitutional theory. 
Only its candor would enable Congress to know whether it may 
constitutionally exercise its jurisdiction-limiting power and 
thereby inaugurate the public discussion of the Court's constitu-
tional policy making that Perry values. We may then look for-
ward, with dubious pleasure, to 5-4 and 3-3-3 decisions not only 
on the merits, but also on whether the decision was "interpretive" 
or "noninterpretive." 
Under these circumstances, Congress probably would use its 
jurisdiction-limiting power more frequently than Perry antici-
pates. Indeed it is not fanciful to suggest that Congress might 
even act to do away with noninterpretive review entirely and in a 
manner that Perry would be forced to accept as constitutional. It 
might enact a statute depriving the Court of appellate jurisdiction 
and the lower federal courts of original and appellate jurisdiction 
over any class of cases or questions that the Court itself concluded 
could not be decided without noninterpretive review. Under such 
a statute any candid effort by the Court to engage in noninterpre-
tive review would instantly self-destruct, because the Court would 
be compelled to dismiss such a case for lack of jurisdiction. 
The consequences of exercising the jurisdiction-limiting 
power are the principal obstacle, in my opinion, to Congress' use 
of this power. Perry discusses them most casually. To deprive the 
federal courts of jurisdiction to pass upon the constitutionality of a 
federal law, Congress would have to forego the use of those courts 
110. Id at 143. 
111. Id at 143-44. 
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to enforce that law. For the supremacy clause prohibits them 
from enforcing unconstitutional laws. Perry tries to surmount this 
difficulty by relying upon the dubious distinction between inter-
pretive and noninterpretive review and arguing that Congress 
could authorize the federal courts to enforce a federal program 
while denying them the power to engage in noninterpretive review 
while doing so. Even if one accepts this theory, the problem of 
state enforcement remains. The jurisdiction-limiting power of 
Congress cannot, of course, curb the state courts in any way. It is 
not clear what Perry thinks the state legislatures and courts would 
do if Congress deprived the federal courts of jurisdiction over a 
particular class of federal constitutional claims. He does not view 
the jurisdiction-limiting power as equivalent to the power to re-
verse a noninterpretive decision by the Court. I 13 He would op-
pose giving Congress power to reverse such a decision because 
that would make the Court "a sort of delegate of Congress, much 
as a court in its common-law role is a delegate of the legislature, 
which may revise the common law."ll4 It would diminish the 
"moral authority of the Court's voice;" its opinions "would be es-
sentially only advisory;" and the "inter-institutional tension" that 
is the "reason to value noninterpretive review in the first place" 
would be undermined. I Is Thus Perry sees the exercise of the juris-
diction-limiting power as "merely silencing the Court" and not 
"reversing the Court on a particular issue."II6 If there is to be a 
significant difference between "merely silencing" the Court and 
reversing it on a particular issue, the Court's decisions that pro-
voked the limitation of its jurisdiction must have some sort of af-
ter-life. Suppose that the decisions had invalidated some federal 
action. Would not the state courts, bound as they are by oath to 
support the federal Constitution, have to follow these decisions 
and invalidate the same federal action when it is challenged in 
their jurisdictions? If so, Congress' purpose in exercising the juris-
diction-limiting power would be thwarted. More than that, it 
seems likely that the state courts would be divided about whether 
the exercise of the jurisdiction-limiting power freed them from the 
obligation to follow the Court's previous decisions. The federal 
program would then be implemented in some states but not in 
others-an intolerable result in our federal system. 
Perry attempts to meet this difficulty by asserting that "a deci-
113. M. PERRY, supra note 3, at 135. 
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sion by a state court opposing its own value judgment to that of a 
branch of the national government should not be deemed binding 
on the national government (or, therefore, on litigants relying on 
the authority-and if necessary the power-of the national gov-
ernment) unless the state court's decision is subject to appellate re-
view by the Supreme Court (or by some other federal court)," which 
of course it would not be in the case supposed.u1 He is referring 
to the exercise of noninterpretive review ("its own value judg-
ment") by the state courts in implementing the requirements of 
the Federal Constitution. But in the situation I supposed, the state 
courts would not be purporting to enforce their own values. 
Rather, they would be discharging their constitutional duty to fol-
low the decisions of the United States Supreme Court which, 
Perry tells us, would not be reversed by the fact that Congress 
silenced the federal judiciary. Congress would have no power to 
prevent the state courts from implementing the Supreme Court's 
decisions. A President seeking to use force to prevent the state 
courts from doing so would face a dilemma. Is it the President's 
constitutional duty to execute faithfully the jurisdiction-limiting 
law of Congress which merely silenced the federal judiciary? 
What does such execution require of the President? Or is it the 
President's constitutional duty to execute the Court's decisions 
that provoked the exercise of the Congressional power but that 
still stand? Or are Presidents to act in accordance with their own 
constitutional values in particular cases? 
Perry does not think these problems can arise with respect to 
"a congressional withdrawal of federal jurisdiction over cases in-
volving challenges to state laws, which ... are the cases at the 
center of the present controversy" concerning noninterpretive re-
view.lls But the only reason he gives for this conclusion is unper-
suasive. He writes that "if a state court strikes down action in the 
exercise of noninterpretive review, there is no problem of legiti-
macy if in the state in question the judges are electorally account-
able," and "even if they are not electorally accountable, 
presumably the state legislature has power over the jurisdiction of 
the state judiciary analogous to Congress' power over the jurisdic-
tion of the federal judiciary."119 Again Perry is thinking of ac-
tivist state judges who read their own predilections into the 
Federal Constitution. But if a state court is instead implementing 
the decisions of the Supreme Court, then the state legislature, 
117. ld at 131-32. 
118. Id at 137. 
119. Id at 131. 
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whose members are also under a duty to support the Federal Con-
stitution as expounded by the Supreme Court, should not inter-
fere. Even if the state judges who followed the Supreme Court 
decisions were defeated in the next election, their successors 
would be under the same constitutional duty. Again, the most 
likely practical outcome is that some state courts would follow the 
Court's decisions while others would not. As a result, federal con-
stitutional rights would vary from state to state. 
I believe the consequences of exercising the jurisdiction-limit-
ing power are so serious for our constitutional system as a whole 
and our federal system in particular, that one of two things would 
happen under Perry's proposal. One possibility is that Congress 
would be unwilling to use the power, making it only an academic 
way to reconcile noninterpretive review with democracy. The 
other possibility is that Congress would exercise the power, with 
results that would make the price of reconciliation unacceptably 
high. If, after almost 200 years of judicial review, there is a con-
sensus that the Court's policies should be subject to the ultimate 
judgment of the electorally accountable branches of government, 
other than by constitutional amendment, the various ways of ac-
complishing this objective should be debated and the way chosen 
embodied in a constitutional amendment. I agree with Professor 
Sager that the "rather bizarre" jurisdiction-limiting power is most 
unsuited to this purpose.12o In the discussion of such an amend-
ment, there would be no need to distinguish between interpretive 
and noninterpretive review. There is no reason why the nine-
teenth century constitutional values of the founding fathers should 
be more immune from review by the politicians than the twentieth 
century constitutional values of the Supreme Court. By now, all 
constitutional law bears the indelible stamp of the Court. 
IV. 
Where does all this leave us? Certainly the lot of the consti-
tutional theorist is not easy. The unnecessary religious metaphor 
used by Perry reflects the truth that the protection of human 
rights, particularly against arbitrary or discriminatory government 
action, is a value Americans share. And we have come to accept 
the idea that these rights should be protected by being set forth in 
a fundamental law limiting popular sovereignty.l2I Once a Court 
is entrusted with the task of implementing the fundamental law, 
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the Justices' own convictions and values will inevitably mark their 
efforts. But since I do not think it is healthy for a democracy to be 
governed by electorally unaccountable judges, theories limiting 
the exercise of the Court's powers appeal more to me than theories 
placing no principled limit on them. 
Perry is not wholly insensitive to the case for judicial re-
straint. He ends the book by recognizing and approving several 
constraints in addition to the threat of the jurisdiction-limiting 
power: the nature of the appointment process; collegial decision-
making; prudence dictated by the Court's limited political capital, 
its institutional competence, and the need for a considerable de-
gree of popular assent to its decisions.122 Yet it is hard to imagine 
what practical applications he envisions for these abstract con-
straints, given his exceedingly optimistic view of the Court's com-
petence. He even raises the possibility that the Court may 
constitutionalize the rights enumerated in the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rightsm-the rights "to 
food, clothing, housing, and education; . . . to work, leisure, fair 
wages, decent working conditions, and social security; . . . to 
physical and mental health, protection for the family, and for 
mothers and children; . . . to participate in cultural life." 124 Perry 
regards it as "[o]ne of the great open questions in constitutional 
law ... whether, and to what extent, the Supreme Court and the 
judiciary generally have the institutional capacity to formulate 
and implement" these rights.m Since the United States has re-
fused to subscribe to the Covenant, Perry's "open question" be-
speaks an amazing degree of faith in government by the judiciary. 
Though we may accept the morality of the claims to well-being 
enumerated in the Covenant, just imagine a bare majority of the 
Court declaring President Reagan's program for economic recov-
ery unconstitutional on the ground that it violates the rights set 
forth in the Covenant. Following Perry, the Justices in the major-
ity would candidly acknowledge that they have incorporated these 
rights in the due process clause because the Covenant reflects their 
own values. There is something wrong with a theory that does not 
bar such absurdities except by counsels of tactical prudence. 
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